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A eusocial colony typically consists of two main castes: queens that reproduce and sterile workers that help them. This division of
labor, however, is vulnerable to genetic elements that favor the development of their carriers into queens. Several factors, such as
intracolonial relatedness, can modulate the spread of such caste-biasing genotypes. Here we investigate the effects of a notable
yet understudied ecological setting: where larvae produced by hybridization develop into sterile workers. Using mathematical
modeling, we show that the coevolution of hybridization with caste determination readily triggers an evolutionary arms race
between nonhybrid larvae that increasingly develop into queens, and queens that increasingly hybridize to produce workers. Even
where hybridization reduces worker function and colony fitness, this race can lead to the loss of developmental plasticity and to
genetically hard-wired caste determination. Overall, our results may help understand the repeated evolution toward remarkable
reproductive systems (e.g., social hybridogenesis) observed in several ant species.
KEY WORDS: Ant, caste determination, eusociality, genetic conflicts, hybridization, Hymenoptera, parasitism, reproductive sys-
tem, social hybridogenesis.
Eusociality is characterized by a striking division of reproduc-
tive labor between two castes: queens and workers (Crespi and
Yanega 1995). Queens monopolize reproduction, while typically
sterile workers specialize on other colony tasks such as foraging
and tending to the brood. The sterility of workers initially seemed
so inconsistent with natural selection that Darwin referred to eu-
sociality as his “one special difficulty” (Darwin 1859, ch. 7). This
apparent paradox was resolved in the 1960s with Hamilton’s the-
ory of kin selection (Hamilton 1964). Hamilton demonstrated that
natural selection can favor eusociality when workers preferen-
tially help relatives (who can transmit the same genetic material).
In addition to laying the theoretical basis for the evolution of eu-
sociality, Hamilton’s work led to the insight that caste determi-
nation should be plastic to allow identical gene copies to be in
workers and in the queen they help (Seger 1981). In line with this
notion, the developmental fate of female larvae in many eusocial
insects depends on environmental factors (Trible and Kronauer
∗These authors share senior authorship.
2017), such as food quantity and quality (Brian 1956, 1973), tem-
perature and seasonality (Brian 1974; Schwander et al. 2008) or
signals emitted by adults of the colony (Penick and Liebig 2012;
Libbrecht et al. 2013). Probably the most iconic example of such
plasticity is found in honeybees where queens arise only from lar-
vae reared in royal cells and fed with royal jelly. For long, this and
many other empirical findings strengthened the idea that caste de-
termination is under strict environmental control and largely free
from genetic effects.
More recently, however, substantial genetic variation for
caste determination has been described across a number of
eusocial species (Winter and Buschinger 1986; Moritz et al.
2005; Hartfelder et al. 2006; Linksvayer 2006; Schwander and
Keller 2008; Smith et al. 2008; Frohschammer and Heinze 2009;
Schwander et al. 2010). This variation is thought to derive
from caste-biasing genotypes that bias the development of their
carrier toward a particular caste (Moritz et al. 2005; Hughes
and Boomsma 2008). Those genotypes that favor larval de-
velopment toward the reproductive caste have sometimes been
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referred to as “royal cheats” as they cause the individuals that
carry them to increase their own direct reproduction at the ex-
pense of other colony members (e.g., Anderson et al. 2008;
Hughes and Boomsma 2008). The segregation of such royal
cheats should depend on a balance between: (1) direct benefits
from increased representation in the reproductive caste; and (2)
indirect costs due to reduced worker production and colony pro-
ductivity (Hamilton 1964). As highlighted by abundant theory,
several factors can influence these benefits and costs and thus tip
the balance for or against the evolution of royal cheats. For in-
stance, low relatedness between larvae due to polyandry (when
queens mate with multiple males) or polygyny (when colonies
have multiple queens) increases competition between genetic lin-
eages within colonies and thereby favors royal cheating (e.g.,
Reuter and Keller 2001). Conversely, selection against cheats is
bolstered by low dispersal abilities and high within-group relat-
edness (e.g., Hamilton 1964; Lehmann et al. 2008; Boomsma
2009), bivoltinism and asymetrical sex-ratio (e.g., Trivers and
Hare 1976; Seger 1983; Alpedrinha et al. 2014; González-Forero
2015; Quiñones and Pen 2017), coercion (i.e., policing; Wense-
leers et al. 2004; Dobata 2012), queen longevity and competi-
tion between queens (e.g., Queller 1994; Bourke and Chan 1999;
Avila and Fromhage 2015), or where workers reproduce follow-
ing queen death (Field and Toyoizumi 2020).
One intriguing factor that has been proposed to influence the
cost of royal cheating is sperm parasitism, a behavior consisting
in queens using the sperm of another species or lineage to pro-
duce hybrid workers (Linksvayer 2006; Anderson et al. 2008).
Both morphological and genetic data suggest that this behavior
is common in many ant species (e.g., in multiple Temnothorax
populations, the majority of queens were found to produce some
hybrid workers; Douwes and Stille 1991; Umphrey 2006 and
Feldhaar et al. 2008 for reviews). In these species, sperm para-
sitism results in hybrid larvae that rarely, if ever, develop as fertile
queens and rather become sterile workers (presumably due to ge-
netic incompatibilities between parental lineages; Feldhaar et al.
2008; Trible and Kronauer 2017). Such hybrids should therefore
be impervious to genetic caste-biasing effects and thus provide
a reliable source of workers. In principle, this alternative sup-
ply of workers may reduce the indirect cost of royal cheats and
hence favor their evolution (Anderson et al. 2008). But beyond
these broad-brush predictions, the effect of sperm parasitism on
the segregation of royal cheats remains poorly understood.
Here, we develop a mathematical model to explore the
evolution of genetic caste determination via royal cheats when
queens can hybridize to produce workers. In particular, we as-
sess the effects of key factors on the evolutionary dynamics of
caste determination, such as polyandry and queen parthenogen-
esis (when queens have the ability to produce daughters asexu-
ally), as well as their interactions with potential costs and benefits
of hybridization, for instance, owing to hybrid incompatibilities
or hybrid vigor.
The Model
We consider a large population of annual eusocial haplodiploids
with the following life-cycle (Fig. 1). First, virgin queens mate
with a fixed number m ∈ {1, 2, . . .} of males. Each of these mates
can either be an allo- (with probability η) or a con-specific male
(with complementary probability 1 − η). Once mated, queens
found monogynous colonies (i.e., one queen per colony) and lay
a large number of eggs. A proportion f of these eggs are diploid
(and develop into females) and (1 − f ) are haploid (and develop
into males). Assuming random egg fertilization, a queen there-
fore produces on average f η hybrid and f (1 − η) nonhybrid fe-
males. We assume that a hybrid female can only develop as a
worker, while a nonhybrid female can either develop as a worker
(with probability ω) or as a queen (with complementary prob-
ability 1 − ω). Overall, a colony thus consists of f η hybrid and
f (1 − η)ω nonhybrid sterile workers, as well as f (1 − η)(1 − ω)
virgin queens and (1 − f ) males that are available for reproduc-
tion at the next generation.
If only virgin queens and males can reproduce, their repro-
ductive success depends on the workforce of their colony of ori-
gin. Specifically, we assume that the probability that a sexual
reaches the mating pool increases linearly with the total num-
ber of workers in the colony, combining hybrid and nonhybrid
workers (we show later that our results do not change qualita-
tively when the increase is nonlinear). We nonetheless allow for
differential contribution to the workload between hybrid and non-
hybrid workers, with the contribution of hybrid workers weighted
by a parameter e ≥ 0 (so that the effective workforce of a colony
is e f η + f (1 − η)ω). When e = 1, hybrid workers have the same
working efficiency as nonhybrid workers. By contrast, when
e < 1, hybrid workers are less efficient, for instance, due to out-
breeding depression. This can also reflect other potential costs
associated with hybridization, such as the production of sterile
or nonviable hybrid queens (Feldhaar et al. 2008). Conversely,
when e > 1, hybrid workers outperform regular workers, due, for
example, to hybrid vigor (Umphrey 2006).
Results
HYBRIDIZATION AND SPERM PARASITISM, EVEN
COSTLY, CAN LEAD TO THE FIXATION OF ROYAL
CHEATS AND THE COMPLETE LOSS OF
INTRASPECIFIC WORKERS
We first investigate the evolution of caste determination by al-
lowing the probability ω that a larva develops as a worker to
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Figure 1. The life cycle of an annual eusocial with hybridization and sperm parasitism. At each generation, the life-cycle begins with
virgin queens mating withmmales, each of which has a probability η to be allospecific and 1 − η to be conspecific. After mating, a queen
founds a colony and starts producing eggs. Hybrid female eggs (with allospecific paternal origin) all develop into workers. Regular female
eggs (with conspecific paternal origin) develop into workers with probability ω and into queens otherwise. The variable η thus captures
the tendency of queens to hybridize and parasitize sperm, while ω controls caste determination.
vary. We assume that this probability is under individual genetic
control (i.e., the future caste of a female larva depends only on
its own genotype) and that it evolves via random mutations with
weak additive phenotypic effects (Appendix A for details on our
methods). Mutational effects are unbiased so a new mutation is
equally likely to increase or decrease the tendency ω of becom-
ing a worker. Those mutations that decrease ω can be consid-
ered as more selfish as they increase the likelihood that their
carriers develop into queens at the expense of other individuals
of the same colony. Following the terminology of Hughes and
Boomsma (2008), we thus refer to mutations decreasing ω as
royal cheats. As a baseline, we consider the case where queens
mate with a large number of males (i.e., m → ∞) and where
hybridization is fixed at a given level (e.g., η is the proportion
of allo-specific males in the pool of mates from which females
choose randomly).
Our analyses (Appendix B.1.1) reveal that the probability for





3(1 − η) . (1)
To interpret this equation (1), consider first the case where hy-
bridization is costless (e = 1). Equation (1) then tells that in
the absence of hybridization (η = 0), a larva will develop into a
worker with a probability of 1/3 at equilibrium (in line with pre-
vious models that ignore hybridization, e.g., Reuter and Keller
2001, Appendix B.1.4 for connection). But as hybridization in-
creases (η > 0), royal cheating is increasingly favored and lar-
vae become increasingly likely to develop as queens rather than
workers (i.e., ω∗ < 1/3, Fig. 2A). In fact past a threshold of hy-
bridization (η ≥ 1/3), the population evolves toward a complete
loss of nonhybrid workers via the fixation of increasingly caste-
biasing royal cheats alleles (ω → 0). In this case, nonhybrid
females eventually all develop into queens that rely on sperm par-
asitism to produce workers.
Equation (1) also shows that the performance of hybrid
workers relative to nonhybrids, e, modulates the effect of hy-
bridization on the evolution of caste determination (Fig. 2B). As
a result, royal cheating and worker-loss evolution are facilitated
when hybrids outperform regular workers (e > 1) but hindered
otherwise (e < 1). Nevertheless, even when hybridization is ex-
tremely costly (0 < e  1), complete worker-loss can evolve
(Fig. 2C).
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Figure 2. The fixation of royal cheats and evolution of intraspecific worker-loss. (A) Evolution of the probability ω that a female larva
develops into aworker in a simulated populationwhen queensmatewith a large number ofmales (polyandry,m → ∞) and the proportion
of allospecificmales η is fixed (top η = 0;middle η = 0.2, bottom η = 0.4; other parameters: e = 1, Appendix A.3 for details on simulations).
Plain lines (and surrounding gray areas) show the population average ω (and its standard deviation). Dashed lines show the predicted
equilibrium (from eq. 1). (B) Equilibrium of ω as a function of hybridization η and the efficiency of hybrid workers e (from eq. 1). (C)
Parameter combinations leading to the evolution of complete worker-loss (i.e., ω → 0, in green, corresponding to η ≥ 1/(1 + 2e), which
is found by substituting eq. 1 into ω∗ ≤ 0).
WORKER-LOSS READILY EMERGES FROM THE
COEVOLUTION OF GENETIC CASTE DETERMINATION
AND SPERM PARASITISM, DRIVEN BY
INTRACOLONIAL CONFLICT
The above analysis indicates that intraspecific worker-loss can
evolve when queens have a sufficiently high tendency to hy-
bridize. This raises the question of whether such tendency is also
subject to selection. To answer this question, we allow the proba-
bility η that a queen’s mate is allospecific to coevolve with caste
determination (ω). We assume that this probability η is under in-
dividual queen control (i.e., it depends only on a queen’s geno-
type) and like caste determination, evolves via rare mutations
with weak additive phenotypic effects (Appendix A for details).
We find that depending on the efficiency e of hybrid work-
ers, the coupled evolutionary dynamics of hybridization η and
caste determination ω lead to an evolutionary arms race with one
of two contrasted outcomes (Appendix B.1.2 for analysis). When
e is small (e ≤ 1/4, Fig. 3A gray region), the population evolves
hybridization avoidance (η → 0) while the probability ω to de-
velop as a worker stabilizes for its baseline equilibrium (ω∗ =
1/3, Fig. 3B). By contrast, when hybrid workers are at least half
as efficient as regular workers (e ≥ 1/2, Fig. 3A, dark green re-
gion), intraspecific worker-loss evolves (ω → 0) and hybridiza-
tion stabilizes at an intermediate equilibrium (η∗ = 2/3, Fig. 3D).
When hybrid worker efficiency is intermediate (1/4 < e < 1/2,
Fig. 3A, light green region), the population evolves either hy-
bridization avoidance or intraspecific worker-loss depending on
initial conditions (Fig. 3C), with worker-loss favored by high ini-
tial tendency η of queens to hybridize. In sum, provided four hy-
brid workers are at least as good as one regular worker (e > 1/4),
the coevolution of genetic caste determination and hybridization
can lead to worker-loss in our model.
To better understand the forces at play in the emergence of
worker-loss, we further used a kin-selection approach to decom-
pose the invasion fitness of mutant alleles into the sum of: (1)
their direct fitness effects on the reproductive success of the indi-
viduals that express them; and (2) of their indirect fitness effects
on other related individuals that can also transmit them (Taylor
and Frank 1996, Appendix B.1.3 for details). Starting with a pop-
ulation at the baseline equilibrium in absence of hybridization
(ω = 1/3, η = 0), we tracked these different fitness effects along
a typical evolutionary trajectory that leads to worker-loss (black
arrow heads, Fig. 3D) for alleles that influence the tendency of a
larva to develop as a worker (Fig. 3E) and of a queen to hybridize
(Fig. 3F).
Our kin selection analysis reveals that alleles that increase
hybridization in queens are selected because they allow queens
to increase the number of sexuals produced by their colony
(especially via males, blue curve, Fig. 3F). This is because the
baseline tendency ω to develop as a worker that evolves is opti-
mal from the point of view of a gene in a larvae, but sub-optimal
from the point of view of a gene in a queen who would benefit
from a larger workforce. Hybridization by queens evolves to
rectify this and align colony composition with the interests of the
queen. Simultaneously, as queens evolve greater hybridization
and augment their workforce with hybrids, genes in nonhybrid
larva have an increasing interest for their carriers to develop
as queens rather than workers (Fig. 3E). These two selective
processes via queens and larvae fuel one another in an evo-
lutionary arms race whose endpoint is complete intraspecific
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Figure 3. The coevolution of caste determination and sperm parasitism. (A) Evolutionary equilibria (for η in black and ω in white) as
a function of hybrid worker efficiency e (eq. B6 in Appendix B.1.2 for details). These equilibria, however, are evolutionary repellors
(eq. B7 in Appendix B.1.2). As a result, three types of coevolutionary dynamics are possible depending on e as illustrated in panels (B)–(D)
(from eq. B5). These panels show examples of phenotypic trajectories when worker-loss: Panel (B) never evolves (e = 0.1); Panel (C) can
evolve depending on initial conditions (e = 0.4); Panel (D) always evolves (e = 0.7). Black filled circles indicate the two evolutionary end-
points: hybridization avoidance with developmental plasticity (ω = 1/3 and η = 0 in B and C) or worker-loss with hybridization (ω = 0
and η = 2/3 in C and D). Empty circle in (C) shows the internal unstable equilibrium (eq. B6). Thick grey arrow heads in (D) represent the
trajectory of a population starting from ω = 1/3 and η = 0 and evolving to worker-loss. (E) Fitness effects of caste determination ω in
a mutant larva via itself (in orange), related queens (red), and related males (blue) along the trajectory leading to worker-loss shown
in panel (D) (total selection in black, Appendix B.1.3 for derivation). We see that negative fitness effects via self (orange line) lead to
a total selection effect that is negative (black line). This indicates that mutant larvae with increasingly small values of ω are selected
because these values increase larvae’s direct fitness (by increasing the probability that they develop into queens). (F) Fitness effects of
hybridization η in a mutant queen, via its sons (blue) and daughter queens (red) along the trajectory leading to worker-loss shown in
panel (D) (total selection in black). Positive total selection (in black) is mostly due to an increase of fitness via males (in blue). This says
that mutant queens with increasingly large values of η are selected because this increases their reproduction, especially via males.
worker-loss. Our decomposition of fitness effects thus shows that
the loss of nonhybrid workers evolves in our model due to within-
colony conflicts over colony composition. In fact, our results
suggests that worker-loss emerges because hybridization allows
queens to control the production of workers in their colony,
while nonhybrid larvae lose their tendency to develop as workers
to promote their own reproduction via the fixation of royal
cheats.
WORKER-LOSS IS IMPAIRED BY LOW POLYANDRY
BUT FACILITATED BY ASEXUAL REPRODUCTION
So far, we have assumed that queens mate with a large, effec-
tively infinite, number of males. By increasing relatedness within
the brood, low polyandry (2 ≤ m  ∞), and monandry (m = 1)
mediate within-colony conflicts and therefore should be rele-
vant to the evolutionary arms race leading to worker-loss (An-
derson et al. 2008; Schwander et al. 2010). To test this, we
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Figure 4. The effects of monandry and low polyandry. (A) Outcome of selection as a function of mate number m and hybrid worker
efficiency e. Over the dashed line, worker-loss is a stable equilibrium (i.e., a population with traits ω = 0 and η = 2/3 cannot be invaded,
eq. B16 in Appendix B.2.1). Over the plain line, hybridization can invadewhen rare (i.e., η = 0 is unstable, eq. B18 in Appendix B.2.1). Below
both lines (gray region), plasticity in caste determination is maintained (as in Fig. 3B). Over both lines (dark green region), hybridization
and worker-loss evolve (as in Fig. 3D). In the light green region, worker-loss evolve for some initial conditions (as in Fig. 3C). In the
blue region, there exists an internal attractor equilibrium (i.e., the population converges toward a phenotype 0 < η∗ < 1 and 0 < ω∗ < 1)
that is either uninvadable (for 2 ≤ m ≤ 4, see, e.g., panel B) or invadable leading to polymorphism (for m = 1, see, e.g., panel C). (B)
Evolution toward an uninvadable phenotype in a simulated population (when e = 1 and m = 2). Each dot represents the value of η of
one of 20 haplotypes randomly sampled every 100 generation in a simulated population of 10,000 queens (Appendix A.3 for details on
simulations). The color of each dot gives the value of ω of the associated haplotype (legend). The horizontal dashed line represents the
predicted equilibrium (from Fig. S1). The gray line represents the mean value of η across the simulation. (C) Evolution toward an invadable
phenotype and the emergence of polymorphism in a simulated population (when e = 1.5 andm = 1, other parameters and figure legend:
same as B).
investigated the effect of mate number m on the coevolution of
ω and η (Appendix B.2.1 for details).
We find that as the number m of mates decreases, the con-
ditions for intraspecific worker-loss emergence become more re-
strictive. Specifically, the threshold of hybrid worker efficiency e
above which worker-loss always evolves increases as polyandry
decreases (as m → 1, Fig. 4A, dark green region). In addition,
when the number of mates is low (m ≤ 4), evolutionary dynam-
ics do not necessarily lead to either complete worker-loss or hy-
bridization avoidance. For intermediate values of e (Fig. 4A, blue
region) the population actually converges to an intermediate state
where queens partially hybridize (0 < η∗ < 1) and larvae retain
developmental plasticity (0 < ω∗ < 1, Fig. 4B, Appendix B.2.1
and Fig. S1 for analysis). Under monandry (m = 1) the evolu-
tion toward such intermediate state always happens when hy-
brid workers outperform regular workers (e > 1, Fig. 4A, blue
region).
In the special case of monandry and overperforming hy-
brid workers (m = 1 and e > 1), our mathematical analysis fur-
ther shows that partial hybridization and larval plasticity is not
evolutionary stable (Appendix B.2.1, Figs. S1 and S2). Rather,
the population experiences disruptive selection that should fa-
vor the emergence of polymorphism. To test this, we performed
individual-based simulations under conditions predicted to lead
to polymorphism (Fig. 4C). These show the emergence and long-
term coexistence of two types of queens: one that hybridizes with
low probability (and reproduces via both males and queens); and
another that mates almost exclusively with allospecific males and
thus reproduces mostly via males (because m = 1, these queens
only produce hybrid workers and males). Beyond this special
case, the evolution of worker-loss is impeded by low polyandry
and impossible under monandry in our model. This is because
with a low number of mates, a queen runs the risk of being fer-
tilized by only one type of male. Under complete worker-loss
(when the population is fixed for ω = 0), a queen mated to only
conspecific males produces only larvae destined to be queens but
no workers to ensure their survival and thus has zero fitness.
Our finding that monandry inhibits the emergence of
worker-loss contrasts with the observation that several ant
species, notably of the genus Cataglyphis, lack nonhybrid work-
ers and rely on sperm parasitism for workers in spite of being
mostly monandrous (Kuhn et al. 2020). One potential mechanism
that could have allowed such evolution is thelytokous partheno-
genetic reproduction by queens, whereby queens can produce
daughters clonally. This reproduction mode, which is common
in eusocial Hymenoptera (Rabeling and Kronauer 2013) and in
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particular in Cataglyphis (Kuhn et al. 2020), could allow queens
fertilized exclusively by allospecific males to nevertheless pro-
duce queens via parthenogenesis. To investigate how thelytok-
ous parthenogenesis influences the evolution of caste determi-
nation, we extend our model so that a fraction c of the female
progeny of queens is produced parthenogenetically (Appendix
B.2.2 for details). We assume that larvae produced in such a way
are equivalent to nonhybrid larvae: they develop into workers
with a probability ω determined by their own genotype (which
in this case is the same as their mother’s genotype) and if they
develop into workers, they have the same working efficiency
as nonhybrid workers (i.e., there is no direct cost or benefit to
parthenogenesis).
The coevolutionary dynamics of caste determination and
hybridization with parthenogenesis are in general too compli-
cated to be tractable. We could nonetheless gain insights into
worker-loss evolution by performing an invasion analysis, ask-
ing (1) when is worker-loss (ω = 0) evolutionary stable (so that
a population where intraspecific workers have been lost can-
not be invaded by a genetic mutant with developmental plas-
ticity)? And (2) when can hybridization evolve when absent
in the population (i.e., when is η = 0 evolutionary unstable)?
When these two conditions are met, evolution will tend to fa-
vor the emergence and maintenance of worker-loss (e.g., as in
Fig. 3D). We thus studied when conditions (1) and (2) above
are both true in terms of parthenogenesis c, as well as hybrid
workers efficiency e and mate number m. This revealed that
parthenogenesis has a nonmonotonic relationship with worker-
loss evolution (Fig. 5A and B). As parthenogenesis increases
from zero, worker-loss evolution is initially favored, especially
under monandry (as expected; e.g., Fig. 5C; see eq. B26 in the
Appendix for details). But past a threshold of parthenogene-
sis, the conditions leading to worker-loss become increasingly
stringent until such evolution becomes impossible (see eq. B25
in the Appendix for details). This is because as parthenogene-
sis increases, the relatedness among a queen and larvae of the
same colony also increases. The conflict between them, which
fuels the evolution of worker-loss, therefore abates until it is
no longer advantageous for a larva to preferentially develop as
a queen.
We additionally computed the level of hybridization favored
by selection when the population has evolved worker-loss (and
this is an evolutionarily stable state). We find that hybridization
increases as queens mate with fewer males and as partheno-
genesis increases (Fig. 5D), so much so that selection can lead
to complete hybridization (η = 1, e.g., Fig. 5C). As a result,
there exists a range of intermediate values of parthenogenesis for
which worker-loss evolves in association with a complete loss of
intraspecific matings, that is, queens never mate with males of
their own species or lineage. These males are nevertheless still
being produced in our model (as the primary sex ratio is such
that f < 1).
Discussion
In sum, our analyses indicate that worker-loss readily evolves
when queens can hybridize with a lineage of males by whom fer-
tilization leads to the production of workers. This evolution in
our model occurs through a sequence of substitutions of alleles
that increasingly bias the development of their carrier toward the
queen caste, that is, “royal cheats”. Hybridization, or sperm par-
asitism, allows royal cheats to fix in the population by providing
a way for colonies to compensate for the reduced workforce. In
fact, when queens are capable of recognizing genetic differences
among males and when royal cheats are present in the popula-
tion, selection favors hybridization by queens to regain control
over caste allocation in their colony. This in turn promotes greater
cheating by larvae, which favors greater hybridization by queens
and so on. This evolutionary arms race, fueled by intracolonial
conflicts, eventually leads to complete intraspecific worker-loss:
a state where larvae have lost their developmental plasticity and
develop as workers or queens depending only on whether they
are the product of hybridization or not, respectively.
MODEL LIMITATIONS
Of course, our analyses are based on several idealized assump-
tions. In particular, we assumed that the probability for larvae
to develop as workers is under complete larval genetic control.
Typically the developmental fate of female larvae also depends
on various environmental factors created by adult colony mem-
bers, such as food quality and quantity (Brian 1956; Trible and
Kronauer 2017), or mechanical (Penick and Liebig 2012) and
chemical (Schwander et al. 2008; Penick et al. 2012) stimuli. The
conclusions of our study apply as long as these environmental
effects are held constant (or evolve more slowly than genetic
caste determination). In this case, worker-loss would emerge
via royal cheats that modify larval developmental reaction norm
to environmental effects in such a way that their carriers are
more likely to develop as queens (Hughes and Boomsma 2008;
Wolf et al. 2018). We also assumed that caste determination
and hybridization evolve via rare mutations with weak additive
effects at a single locus. These assumptions, which are typical to
adaptive dynamics and kin selection approaches, have been ex-
tensively discussed elsewhere in a general context (Frank 1998;
Rousset 2004; Geritz and Gyllenberg 2005; Dercole and Rinaldi
2008). In particular, all our results extend to the case where
traits are determined by many genes and/or many co-segregating
alleles, provided genetic variance in the population remains small
(e.g., Charlesworth 1990; Iwasa et al. 1991; Abrams et al. 1993;
Mullon and Lehmann 2019). In cases where mutations have
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Figure 5. The influence of thelytokous parthenogenesis. (A) and (B) Invasion analysis as a function of parthenogenesis c and hybrid
worker efficiency e (with m = 1 in A and m = 2 in B). In the region over the plain line, hybridization can invade when rare (i.e., η = 0
is unstable, eq. B23). In the region over the dashed line (in A) or framed by the dotted and dashed lines (in B), worker-loss is a stable
equilibrium (i.e., a population at equilibrium for η and with ω = 0 cannot be invaded, Appendix B.2.2, eqs. B25 and B26 for details).
In the dark green region, selection thus favors both the evolution of hybridization and the maintenance of worker-loss (e.g., panel C).
In the light green region, worker-loss can evolve only for some initial conditions (as in Fig. 3C). (C) Phenotypic trajectories leading to
worker-loss (when e = 0.9, c = 0.4, and m = 1). Arrows show the direction of evolution favored by selection. Black filled circles indicate
the evolutionary end-point. The black line shows the average trait values of a simulated population starting at (ω = 1/2, η = 0). In this
example, selection leads to a state where worker-loss (ω = 0) is coupled with complete hybridization (η = 1). (D) Level of hybridization
η favored by selection when worker-loss has evolved (ω = 0) as a function of parthenogenesis c. This shows that worker-loss is always
associated to complete hybridization (η = 1) under monandry (m = 1) and if c ≥ (m− 1)/(3m− 1) under polyandry (m > 1) (Appendix
B.2.2, eq. B24, for details).
large additive or dominance effects, we expect more complex
evolutionary dynamics, such as genetic polymorphism. These
dynamics can nonetheless be straightforwardly investigated with
the recurrence equations we derived (eq. A4 in Appendix). How-
ever, our model cannot accommodate potential interaction effects
among loci (i.e., epistasis). If a quantitative genetics analysis in
Temnothorax curvispinosus supports that caste determination is
influenced by additive effects in this species (Linksvayer 2006),
only epistatic effects were found in Pogonomyrmex rugosus
(Schwander and Keller 2008). It would therefore be relevant in
the future to allow for a more complex genetic basis of caste de-
termination, including epistasis (in particular, in the context of the
evolution of unorthodox reproductive systems, see next section).
Another important assumption we made is that hybrid larvae
do not develop into fertile queens, for instance owing to hybrid
incompatibilities (Trible and Kronauer 2017). If fertile hybrid
queens are produced regularly, evolution toward worker-loss like
in our model is less likely to happen as hybrids no longer make
a reliable source of workers. In ants at least, the idea that hybrid
queens are rarely fertile is supported by the contrast between
high frequency of interspecific mating on one hand, and weak
genetic signals of interspecific gene flow on the other (Umphrey
2006; Feldhaar et al. 2008). Finally, we focused in the main text
on the case where colony productivity increases linearly with
8 EVOLUTION LETTERS 2021
A. WEYNA ET AL.
workers (i.e., the probability that a sexual survives until reproduc-
tion increases linearly with the number of workers). More realis-
tically, the gain in productivity brought by one additional worker
is likely to decrease with increasing workforce (Nonacs and
Tobin 1992; Reuter and Keller 2001). Such diminishing returns
tend to favor cheating because the indirect benefit of developing
into a worker gets smaller as colony size increases (e.g., Reuter
and Keller 2001; Field and Toyoizumi 2020). In line with this, we
find that worker-loss evolves even more easily under diminishing
compared to linear returns (Appendix B.2.3 and fig. S3).
AN ADAPTIVE PATH TO UNORTHODOX
REPRODUCTIVE SYSTEMS?
Our result that sperm parasitism favors the emergence of worker-
loss via the fixation of royal cheats may be relevant to unorthodox
reproductive systems found in ants. Of particular interest is so-
cial hybridogenesis, whereby females produced through regular
intralineage mating or thelytokous parthenogenesis develop into
queens, while workers emerge from eggs fertilized by allospecific
males (Helms Cahan et al. 2002; Helms Cahan and Vinson 2003;
Anderson et al. 2006; Romiguier et al. 2017; Lacy et al. 2019;
Kuhn et al. 2020). Such a striking system was first described just
two decades ago in Pogonomyrmex harvester ants (Helms Cahan
et al. 2002), and has since been found in several species spread
across four genera (Helms Cahan et al. 2002; Helms Cahan and
Vinson 2003; Romiguier et al. 2017; Lacy et al. 2019; Kuhn et al.
2020). If these observations suggest that social hybridogenesis
has evolved independently multiple times, the evolutionary ori-
gins of this complex system remain poorly understood (Ander-
son et al. 2008; Schwander et al. 2010; Lavanchy and Schwan-
der 2019). One early suggestion is based on the hypothesis that
worker development requires the combination of co-adapted alle-
les at key loci (i.e., requires epistatic interactions; Helms Cahan
and Keller 2003). According to this theory, worker-loss in hy-
bridogenetic lineages would have originated in the random loss
of such combinations during episodes of ancestral hybridization.
Present hybridization would then have evolved to restore genetic
combinations and epistatic interactions in F1-hybrids allowing
for worker development.
Here, we have shown mathematically that social hybrido-
genesis could also result from additive genetic effects on caste
development and queen-larvae conflicts within colonies. This
theory, previously described verbally in Anderson et al. (2006,
2008), may help explain the multiple convergence toward social
hybridogenesis because virtually every sexual eusocial species
should experience queen-larvae conflicts over caste investment.
Furthermore, because this path to social hybridogenesis does
not depend on changes in the sympatric species whose sperm
is parasitized, our model is relevant to both cases of asymmet-
rical (where the sympatric species produces workers through
regular sex, as, e.g., in Solenopsis xyloni; Helms Cahan and
Vinson 2003) and symmetrical social hybridogenesis (where
the sympatric species also produces workers via hybridiza-
tion, as, e.g., in Pogonomyrmex harvester ants; Anderson et al.
2006).
Our model may also be relevant to other unorthodox sys-
tems of reproduction such as those found in populations of Was-
mannia auropunctata (Fournier et al. 2005), Vollenhovia emeyri
(Ohkawara et al. 2006), or Paratrechina longicornis (Pearcy et al.
2011). As with some forms of social hybridogenesis, queens of
these systems produce their reproductive daughters via female
parthenogenesis and their workers via sex with genetically dis-
tant males. In contrast to social hybridogenesis, however, these
males belong to a divergent all-male lineage maintained by male
clonality. This is further accompanied with a complete absence
of arrhenotokous males (i.e., queens never make hemiclonal hap-
loid sons, as shown in W. auropunctata; Rey et al. 2013). When
queens are able to produce daughters parthenogenetically in our
model, evolution can lead to a state where worker-loss is cou-
pled with a complete absence of intralineage mating (i.e., η = 1,
Fig. 5C and D). In this state, arrhenotokous males represent a
genetic dead-end, laying the basis for their disappearance. To in-
vestigate these systems in more detail, it would be interesting to
extend our model to consider the evolution of female partheno-
genesis and male clonality.
Our formal approach is especially useful in a context where
hybrid vigor in workers has been raised to explain the evolu-
tionary origin of social hybridogenesis and other hybridization-
dependent systems (Julian and Cahan 2006; Umphrey 2006; An-
derson et al. 2008; Feldhaar et al. 2008; Schwander et al. 2010).
According to this argument, selection favored hybridization be-
cause hybrid workers are more efficient, more resilient, or bet-
ter suited to exploit marginal habitats than regular workers. But
in spite of much effort, empirical evidence supporting hybrid
vigor in workers is still lacking (Ross and Robertson 1990; James
et al. 2002; Julian and Cahan 2006; Feldhaar et al. 2008). Fur-
ther challenging this view, we have shown here that hybrid vigor
is not necessary to the evolution of hybridization-dependent re-
productive systems. In fact, our results demonstrate that these
systems can easily evolve even when hybridization is costly due
to pre- and postzygotic barriers (i.e., when e < 1, e.g., because
hybridization leads to an inefficient workforce due to hybrid in-
compatibilities in workers; or increased efforts in mate-finding
and mating, Maroja et al. 2014; or the production of nonviable
or infertile hybrid queens, Umphrey 2006; Feldhaar et al. 2008).
In contrast to previous suggestions (Anderson et al. 2008), our
model thus indicates that hybridization-dependent reproductive
systems can emerge among species that have already substan-
tially diverged, and can be maintained even with further accumu-
lation of hybrid incompatibilities.
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More generally, our results suggest that natural selection
can lead to an association between hybridization and caste
determination. To date, such associations have been reported in
only 18 distinct ant species or populations (Helms Cahan et al.
2002; Helms Cahan and Vinson 2003; Fournier et al. 2005; An-
derson et al. 2006; Ohkawara et al. 2006; Pearcy et al. 2011;
Romiguier et al. 2017; Lacy et al. 2019; Kuhn et al. 2020). But
this rarity may be due—at least partly—to the difficulty with de-
scribing these systems (which in particular requires sampling and
genotyping both queens and workers of the same populations,
Helms Cahan et al. 2002). For instance, studies specifically test-
ing for social hybridogenesis discovered five new cases of this re-
productive system in Cataglyphis (out of 11 species tested, Kuhn
et al. 2020) and three in Messor (out of 9, Romiguier et al. 2017).
These considerations, together with our results, support the no-
tion that currently known cases likely represent only a small frac-
tion of extant eusocial systems relying on hybridization (Helms
Cahan et al. 2002; Lavanchy and Schwander 2019).
FACTORS PROMOTING THE EVOLUTION OF
INTRASPECIFIC WORKER-LOSS
In addition to showing that hybrid vigor is not necessary for the
emergence of intraspecific worker-loss, our model highlights sev-
eral factors that can facilitate such evolution. The first of these
is polyandry, which favors sperm parasitism and worker-loss
by minimizing the risks associated with hybridization. Interest-
ingly, even though polyandry is generally rare in social insects
(Strassmann 2001; Hughes et al. 2008), meaningful exceptions
are found in Pogonomyrmex (Rheindt et al. 2004) and Messor
(Norman et al. 2016) harvester ants, two taxa where social hy-
bridogenesis has evolved multiple times (Anderson et al. 2006;
Romiguier et al. 2017). Although the number of males a queen
mates with is fixed in our model, it is conceivable that this number
also responds to hybridization, leading polyandry and hybridiza-
tion to coevolve. Indeed as low levels of polyandry represent a
risk for out-breeding queens, we can expect selection to favor
queen behaviors that increase their number of mates. This would
in turn allow for greater levels of hybridization, which would in-
crease selection on polyandry and so on. We therefore expect
that the coevolution between polyandry, hybridization, and caste
determination further promotes the emergence of worker loss.
For species that are fixed for strict (or close to) monandry, our
model shows that worker-loss can evolve when queens have the
ability to reproduce via thelytokous parthenogenesis as it allows
interspecifically mated queens to nevertheless produce daughter
queens. This supports the notion that thelytoky has been impor-
tant for the convergent evolution of social hybridogenesis in the
(mostly) monandrous Cataglyphis ants (Kuhn et al. 2020).
Although not considered in our study for simplicity, another
factor that can minimize the risks associated with hybridization
in monandrous species is polygyny, whereby related queens form
multi-queen nests. Such social organization allows both intra-
and interspecifically mated queens to be part of the same colony,
which can then produce both queens and workers. Polygyny
should therefore further facilitate hybridization. Although this
may have played a role in the evolution of social hybridogene-
sis in the polygynous Solenopsis species with this reproductive
system (Helms Cahan and Vinson 2003; Lacy et al. 2019), we do
not expect polygyny to be critical for the evolution of worker-loss
as such loss has been described in both monogynic and polyg-
ynic species of the same genus (e.g., Messor barbarus and cf.
structor; Romiguier et al. 2017). Beyond these considerations,
any trait (e.g., polyandry, polygyny, or reproduction by workers)
that influences kinship structure within colonies and thus modu-
lates intracolonial conflicts has the potential to play a role in the
evolution of worker-loss. Studying the evolution of such traits
and its feedback on hybridization and caste determination there-
fore represents an interesting avenue for future research.
More important for the evolution of worker-loss in our
model is that queens hybridize often enough. This readily hap-
pens when the propensity of queens to mate with allo- versus con-
specific males evolves (Fig. 3). In this case, sperm parasitism,
worker-loss, and social hybridogenesis emerge even in species
that initially do not hybridize. Such evolution of hybridization is
especially likely to occur where queens are able to recognize dif-
ferences among males and choose their mates accordingly. There
is, however, currently little, if any, evidence for such direct mate
or sperm choice in eusocial insects (Strassmann 2001; Schwander
et al. 2006; Umphrey 2006; Feldhaar et al. 2008). Alternatively,
queens may be able to modulate the degree of hybridization via
more indirect mechanisms, such as mating flight synchroniza-
tion (Kaspari et al. 2001). Under completely random mating, hy-
bridization can reach sufficient levels for worker-loss to evolve
in our model as long as allo-specific males are sufficiently abun-
dant (Fig. 2), for instance, because phenology is shared with an
ecologically dominant species (Klein et al. 2017). In intermediate
situations where allo-specific males are available but scarce, the
evolution of caste determination under random mating leads to a
situation where queens produce both hybrid and nonhybrid work-
ers (Fig. 2A and B). Such a scenario may be relevant to species of
ants where hybrid workers has been reported but where worker-
loss has not evolved (e.g., in some North American Solenopsis or
European Temnothorax; Feldhaar et al. 2008).
Whether it occurs randomly or not, hybridization requires
pre-zygotic barriers to be sufficiently low. Various mechanisms,
such as secondary contacts or high dispersal ability, are known to
lower these barriers (de Aguiar et al. 2009). In particular, it has
been proposed that the typically low phenotypic variation among
males of different ant species facilitates hybridization in this taxa
(Feldhaar et al. 2008). With these considerations in mind, it is
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noteworthy that all known cases of social hybridogenesis have
been found in ants that live in dry climates (Helms Cahan et al.
2002; Helms Cahan and Vinson 2003; Romiguier et al. 2017;
Lacy et al. 2019; Kuhn et al. 2020), where the synchronicity of
mating flights between species is highest due to shared depen-
dence on punctual climatic events (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990;
Feldhaar et al. 2008).
At a broader level, our results suggest that worker-loss can
readily evolve when a source of workers that is impervious to
royal cheats can be exploited by queens. Besides sperm para-
sitism, other forms of parasitism can provide such a source of
workers and have been associated with worker-loss (Nonacs and
Tobin 1992). In inquiline ants such as Teleutomyrmex schnei-
deri, for instance, queens do not themselves produce workers
but rather infiltrate the colony of a host and trick host work-
ers into caring for their progeny (Hölldobler and Wilson 1990;
Buschinger 2009). Like in our model, such social parasitism
could be the endpoint of an arms race between queens and larvae
of the same lineage, whereby increasingly caste-biasing cheats
reduce colony workforce leading queens to increasingly rely on
host workers.
CONCLUSIONS
Intracolonial conflicts are inevitably part of the social lives of
nonclonal organisms. Here we have shown that such conflicts
readily lead to an association between interspecific sperm par-
asitism and intraspecific worker-loss via the fixation of royal
cheats. This association is especially relevant to the evolution of
reproductive systems that like social hybridogenesis rely on hy-
bridization. Beyond these unorthodox systems and sperm para-
sitism, the fixation of royal cheats and loss of intraspecific work-
ers may be connected to other forms of antagonistic interspecific
relationships such as social parasitism. More broadly, our model
illustrates how the unique conflicts that are inherent to eusocial
life can lead to evolutionary arms races, with implications for
elaborate reproductive systems and novel ecological interactions
between species.
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Appendices
A Methods
Here we describe our methods to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of: (1) the probability ω
for a non-hybrid larvae to develop as a worker; and (2) the propensity η for queens to hybridize.
These methods are organised as follows. First in section A.1, we present a population genetics
model that describes the change in allele frequencies at a biallelic locus that determines the
value of ω in larvae and of η in queens. Second (in section A.2.1), we obtain the invasion fitness
of a mutant allele coding for deviant trait values in a population otherwise monomorphic for
a resident allele. Then, we use this invasion fitness in section A.2 as a platform to infer the
long-term adaptive dynamics of both traits (i.e. their gradual evolution under the input of rare
mutations with weak phenotypic effects). Specifically, we derive the joint evolutionary equilibria
of ω and η (i.e. singular values), as well as their properties (i.e. convergence stability and
evolutionary stability, Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008 for textbook treatment). Finally in section
A.3, we describe our individual-based simulations. A Mathematica notebook reproducing our
analyses and figures is provided as a supplement here: https://zenodo.org/record/4434257.
A.1 Short term evolution: population genetics
A.1.1 Set-up
We consider a single locus with two alleles, a and b, that affect the expression of both ω and η
in their carrier. Specifically, the probability for a larva with genotype v ∈ {aa, ab, bb} to develop
as a worker is ωv, while each mate of a queen with genotype v ∈ {aa, ab, bb} is allospecific
with a probability ηv. To track the segregation of alleles a and b in the population, we let
paa(t), pbb(t), and pab(t) respectively denote the proportion of queens with genotype aa, bb and
ab before mating at generation t (with paa(t) + pbb(t) + pab(t) = 1). Similarly, pa (t) and pb (t)
respectively denote the proportion of conspecific males with haploid genotype a and b before
mating at generation t (with pa (t) + pb (t) = 1).
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A.1.2 Recurrence equations for the evolution of genotype frequencies
Our first goal is to develop recurrence equations for the frequencies of each genotype in males
and females (i.e. express pu(t+ 1) and pv (t+ 1) in terms of pu(t) and pv (t) for u ∈ {a, b} and
v ∈ {aa, ab, bb}). By definition, these frequencies can be written as
pu(t+ 1) =
nu(t+ 1)
na (t+ 1) + nb (t+ 1)
pv (t+ 1) =
nv (t+ 1)
naa(t+ 1) + nab(t+ 1) + nbb(t+ 1)
,
(A-1)
where nu(t+ 1) is the number of males of genotype u ∈ {a, b} at generation t+ 1, and nv (t+ 1)
the number of queens of genotype v ∈ {aa, ab, bb} at generation t+ 1 in the mating pool. Under
our assumption that the probability for a sexual to reach the mating pool increases with the
workforce of a colony (section 2 in main text), the numbers of males and females of each genotype
can be expressed as:
nv (t+ 1) = xaa v(t)naa(t)paa(t) + xab vnab(t)pab(t) + xbb vnbb(t)pbb(t)
nv (t+ 1) = xaa v(t)naa(t)paa(t) + xab v(t)nab(t)pab(t) + xbb v(t)nbb(t)pbb(t),
(A-2a)
where xu v(t) is the number of males with genotype v ∈ {a, b}, and xu v(t) the number of
queens with genotype v ∈ {aa, ab, bb}, produced by a colony founded by a queen of genotype
u ∈ {aa, ab, bb} at generation t. Following Reuter and Keller (2001), we assume that these
numbers are proportional to the energy invested into the production of sexuals. So instead of
numbers, xu v(t) can be viewed as the investment into the production of males (of genotype
v ∈ {a, b}) and xu v(t) into the production of queens (of genotype v ∈ {aa, ab, bb}) by a colony
whose queen has genotype u ∈ {aa, ab, bb}. Finally, nu(t) is the effective workforce of a colony
whose queen has genotype u ∈ {aa, ab, bb} at generation t. This effective workforce is given by
the sum of all types of workers present in a colony, including hybrids (with the latter weighted
by their efficiency e), i.e.
nu(t) =
(
xu aa(t) + xu ab(t) + xu bb(t) + exu hyb(t)
)α
(A-2b)
where xu v(t) is the investment into the production of workers of genotype v ∈ {aa, ab, bb, hyb}
(with hyb denoting hybrid genotype) made by a colony whose queen has genotype u ∈ {aa, ab, bb}
at generation t. The parameter α > 0 determines the effect of the workforce on the probability
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for a sexual to reach the mating pool. When α = 1, investment in workers affects the survival of
queens and males linearly (i.e. one extra unit of workforce always increases survival by the same
amount). By contrast when α < 1, investment in workers show diminishing returns. Conversely
when α > 1, investment in workers show increasing returns. For most of our analyses, we assume
linear effects of the workforce (α = 1). We relax this assumption in section B.2.3.
We specify the investments into males, xu v(t), queens, xu v(t), and workers, xu v(t), in terms
of model parameters in Table S1. For the sake of completeness, we do so for a model that
encompasses all the effects explored sequentially in the main text, i.e. we allow for both traits
ω and η to coevolve; for a finite number m of mates for each queen; and for a fraction c of a
queen’s brood to be produced via parthenogenesis. To read Table S1, note that the different
investments made by a colony with a queen of type u ∈ {aa, ab, bb} (i.e. xu v(t), xu v(t), and
xu v(t)) depend on the types of males she has mated with. To capture this, we let Mu,v be the
random number of males of genotype v ∈ {a, b, h} (where h denotes allospecific type) that a
queen of genotype u ∈ {aa, ab, bb} mates with. Assuming that each mate is independent from
one another, these random variables follow a multinomial distribution with parameters,
Mu = (Mu,a,Mu,b,Mu,h) ∼ Multinomial
(
m, (1− ηu)pa (t), (1− ηu)pb (t), ηu
)
, (A-3)
where m is the total number of mates; (1−ηu)pv (t) is the probability that in one mating event a
queen of type u mates with a conspecific male of type v ∈ {a, b} (which requires that this queen
does not hybridize, with probability (1− ηu), and encounters a male of type v, with probability
given by its proportion, pv (t)); and ηu is the probability that in one mating event a queen of
type u mates with an allospecific male.
To get to the recurrence equations tracking the proportion of males and queens of each genotype,
we first substitute the entries of Table S1 into eq. (A-2) (with α = 1). Doing so we obtain
polynomials for the numbers nv (t + 1) (for v ∈ {a, b}) and nv (t + 1) (for v ∈ {aa, ab, bb}) in
terms of the random variables Mu,a, Mu,b, and Mu,h (with u ∈ {aa, ab, bb}). We marginalise
(i.e. take the expectation of) these polynomials over the joint probability mass function of Mu,a,
Mu,b, and Mu,h for each u ∈ {aa, ab, bb}, which is given by eq. (A-3). Finally, the so-obtained
numbers of different types of individuals (eq. A-2) are substituted into eq. (A-1). From this








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that is characterised by a mapping F : [0, 1]3 → [0, 1]3. This recurrence is too complicated to be
presented here for the general case but can straightforwardly be iterated numerically to track
allelic frequency changes for given parameter values (see Mathematica notebook for e.g.).
A.2 Long-term evolution: adaptive dynamics
To gain more analytical insights, we use the recurrence eq. (A-4) to study the long term adaptive
dynamics of both traits under the assumption that traits evolve via mutations that are rare and
with weak additive phenotypic effects.
A.2.1 Invasion fitness of rare additive allele
An adaptive dynamics model is typically based on the invasion fitness of a mutant allele in a
population that is otherwise fixed for a resident allele (i.e. the asymptotic growth rate of a
mutant allele). To obtain this invasion fitness, we first introduce some notation. We denote the
resident allele by a vector z = (ω, η) where ω is probability that a larva homozygote for the
resident allele develops into a worker, and η is the probability that a mate of queen homozygote
for the resident allele is allo-specific. Similarly, the mutant allele is described by a vector
ζ = (ω + δω, η + δη) whose first entry gives the probability that a larva homozygote for the
mutant allele develops into a worker, and whose second entry is the probability that a mate of a
queen homozygote for the mutant allele is allo-specific (δω and δη thus denote the mutant effect
on trait values). Assuming additive genetic effects on phenotypes, a heterozygote then expresses
phenotype (ω + δω/2, η + δη/2).
To use the recurrence equations developed in the previous section, we arbitrarily set allele a as
the resident and b as the mutant. The allele specific trait values (appearing in table S1 and
5
eq. A-3) are then replaced by:
ωaa = ω




ωbb = ω + δω
ηaa = η




ηbb = η + δη.
(A-5)
Next, we use the fact that the mutant is rare so that its frequency in the population is of the
order of a small parameter denoted 0 < ε 1. As a rare allele can only be found in heterozygous
form in a large panmictic population, the initial dynamics of a mutant allele b can be described
through linear approximations of pb (t + 1) and pab(t + 1) at a near-zero frequency of b (e.g.
Brännström et al., 2013). In other words, eq. (A-4) can be linearised to
pb (t+ 1)
pab(t+ 1)




where A(ζ, z) is a 2× 2 matrix that depends on mutant and resident phenotypes, ζ and z, and
ε is a small parameter of the order of the frequency of the mutant b in males and queens.
The invasion fitness of the mutant phenotype, which we write as W (ζ, z), is then given by the
leading eigenvalue of A(ζ, z) (e.g. Caswell, 2000), i.e.





where λmax(M) gives the leading eigenvalue of a matrix M. In a large population, W (ζ, z) tells
the fate of the mutant allele. If W (ζ, z) ≤ 1, then the mutant allele is purged by selection and
vanishes with probability one. Otherwise if W (ζ, z) > 1, the mutant has a non zero probability
of invading the population (e.g. Brännström et al., 2013).
A.2.2 Directional selection
When mutations are rare with weak phenotypic effects, the population first evolves under direc-
tional selection whereby an advantageous mutation fixes before a new mutation arises so that
the population “jumps” from one monomorphic state to another (Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008).
To study these dynamics, we use the selection gradient, s(z), which is a vector pointing in the
direction favoured by selection at every point z ∈ [0, 1]× [0, 1] of the phenotypic space (i.e., the
6
space of all possible phenotypic combinations with ω and η both between 0 and 1 as they are
















where sω(z) and sη(z) give the direction of selection on ω and η respectively.
Singular strategies. A singular strategy, z∗ = (ω∗, η∗), is such that all selection gradients
are equal to zero,
s(z∗) = 0. (A-9)
A singular strategy therefore represents a potential equilibrium in the context of adaptive dy-
namics (Brännström et al., 2013).
Jacobian matrix and convergence stability. Whether the population evolves towards or




















Specifically, one necessary condition for a singular strategy to be an evolutionary attractor is
that the greatest real part of the eigenvalues of J(z∗) is negative (Leimar, 2009). Such a singular
strategy z∗ is said to be convergence stable. Otherwise, the population will be repelled away
from z∗. Even if z∗ is convergence stable, it is possible for the population to evolve away from
z∗ when both evolving traits are genetically correlated (Leimar, 2009). A sufficient condition
for a singular strategy to be an attractor is that the symmetric part of the Jacobian matrix,
(J(z∗) + J(z∗)T)/2, is negative-definite, in which case z∗ is said to be strongly convergence
stable (Leimar, 2009). When this is true, the population evolves towards z∗, whatever the
genetic correlations between both traits (i.e. independently from the statistical distribution of
mutational effects on both traits).
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A.2.3 Stabilising/disruptive selection.
Once the population is at an equilibrium for directional selection (i.e. a convergence stable
phenotype), it either remains monomorphic under stabilising selection (when the equilibrium is
evolutionary stable or uninvadable, Parker and Maynard Smith, 1990) or becomes polymorphic
due to disruptive selection (when the equilibrium is not evolutionary stable or invadable, Geritz
et al., 1998). When two traits are coevolving, this depends on the Hessian matrix (Phillips and

























An equilibrium z∗ is uninvadable if H(z∗) is negative-definite. Otherwise, selection may be
disruptive and the population may experience evolutionary branching, whereby it splits among
two diverging morphs (Geritz et al., 1998, Leimar, 2009, Geritz et al., 2016).
A.3 Individual-based simulations
To complement our mathematical analysis, we also performed individual based simulations (an
R script implementing these is provided as a supplement here: https://zenodo.org/record/
4434257). These simulations track a population of Nq = 10000 diploid queens (with f = 0.5,
see figure legends for other parameters). Each queen is characterized by its genotype: a pair
of haplotypes, each of which is given by the values of ω and η they code for (so four genotypic
values in total). Simulations are initialized by setting both haplotypes of all Nq queens to the
same arbitrary values (i.e. we start with a monomorphic population). Each generation of a
simulation consists of the following steps:
1. Mating. First, queens mate. To model this process, we first compute the propensity ηi
of each queen i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nq} to hybridize as the mean of the two relevant alleles it is
carrying. Then, each queen i is mated with a number mi of conspecific haploid males. This
number mi is drawn from a binomial distribution with m trials and success probability
(1 − ηi) (in line with eq. A-3). At the first generation, all males carry the same genetic
values for ω and η as queens (i.e. the initial trait values). In subsequent generations, males
8
are sampled (with replacement) as single haplotypes from the 2i haplotypes present in the
laying queens of the previous generation. Following eq. (A-2a), the probability to sample
a given haplotype is weighted by the investment in workers within its colony of origin (as
the investment in workers increases the probability for males to reach the mating pool).
2. Colony development. Each queen i settles to form a colony. We characterise each colony
in two steps. First, a list is constructed that contains the 2mi non-hybrid diploid female
genotypes produced within each colony (i.e. the combinations of the alleles of a queen and
of its conspecific mates). If thelytokous parthenogenesis is included (c > 0), the genotype
of the queen itself is added to this list. Second, the investment in workers within each
colony is calculated following equations in table S1 and eq. (A-2b). These calculations use
the genetic value expressed by each of the 2mi + 1 non-hybrid genotype within the female
progeny (characterised in the first step), as well as the proportion of the brood produced
sexually and asexually (the parameter c), the proportion of conspecific and allospecific
males the queen has mated with (i.e. mi/m and 1 −mi/m), and the efficiency of hybrid
workers (the parameter e).
3. Next-generation queens. To generate the next generation of queens, Nq new diploid
female genotypes are sampled (with replacement) from all non-hybrid genotypes produced
within each colony. Following table S1, the probability to sample a given genotype is
weighted by its own genetic value of (1 − ω) and by the investment in workers within its
colony of origin (as the investment in workers increases the probability for queens to reach
the mating pool). Finally, each genotypic value independently mutates with probability
10−2. Mutation effects are drawn independently from a normal distribution with mean
0 and standard deviation 10−2. Mutated genetic values are capped between 0 and 1 to
ensure that traits remain within their domain of definition.
9
B Analyses
Here, we present the derivations of our results summarised in the main text. These derivations
are organised in the same order as they appear in the main text. As a supplement, we also
provide a Mathematica (Wolfram Research, 2020) notebook that allows to follow our analyses.
B.1 Baseline model
We first explore the baseline case where females mate with a large (effectively infinite) number
of mates and there is no parthenogenesis (i.e. when m→∞ and c = 0).
B.1.1 Independent evolution of genetic caste determination
As presented in the main text, we initially assume that hybridization η is fixed and only caste
determination ω evolves. Using eq. (A-8) with m → ∞ and c = 0, we find that the selection











Accordingly, there is a unique singular strategy ω∗ for caste determination when hybridization
η is fixed (i.e. ω∗ such that sω((ω







which is eq. 1 of the main text.
It is straightforward to show that with hybridization fixed, the singular strategy (eq. B-2) is
convergence stable (plugging eq. B-2 into the Jacobian, that is eq. A-10, for a single trait with





= − 9(1− η)
2
4(1 + η(e− 1))2
< 0 (B-3)
as well as uninvadable (plugging eq. B-2 into the Hessian, that is eq. A-11, for a single trait with





= − 3(1− η)
2
4(1 + η(e− 1))2
< 0. (B-4)
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Therefore, when hybridization is fixed, our analyses show that genetic caste determination will
gradually evolve to the singular value eq. (B-2) and remain monomorphic for this value (which
is what we observe when we simulate this scenario, fig. 2A).
B.1.2 Coevolution of genetic caste determination and hybridization
An unstable singularity. When both caste determination ω and hybridization η evolve, their























(from eq. A-8 with m → ∞ and c = 0). Solving the above for z∗ = (ω∗, η∗) such that s(z∗) =












which is plotted in fig. 3A against e. However, when we look at the Jacobian matrix of the













we see that this matrix has a negative determinant,
det (J(z∗)) = − 9
64e2
< 0 (B-8)
so its eigenvalues cannot both be negative (since the product of the eigenvalues of a matrix is
equal to its determinant). Hence the singular value z∗ eq. (B-6) is not convergence stable, but
rather an evolutionary repellor.
Our result that evolutionary trajectories will be repelled away from the singular value eq. (B-6)
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tells us that adaptive dynamics will eventually get to the boundary of the trait space. This trait
space consists of the square [0, 1] × [0, 1] (as both traits must be between zero and one). Two
edges of this square (when ω = 1 or η = 1) cannot be accessed by evolutionary dynamics as
either of these trait values lead to zero fitness (as a population monomorphic for ω = 1 or η = 1
produces no queen in our baseline model). We can therefore focus on dynamics along the edges
η = 0 or ω = 0 of the trait space, which respectively correspond to the case of hybridization
avoidance and worker-loss.
Convergence to hybridization avoidance. Evolutionary dynamics will settle somewhere
on the edge where hybridization is absent in the population (η = 0) only if: (1) selection on
hybridization maintains it at zero (i.e. sη(z) ≤ 0 when η = 0); and (2) selection on caste
determination settles for an equilibrium ω∗ (i.e. sω(z) = 0 for some ω
∗ when η = 0). From
eq. (B-5), these two conditions are true when e ≤ 1/2 and the equilibrium for caste determination
is simply ω∗ = 1/3 (in line with eq. B-2). As established in eq. (B-3), this equilibrium is
convergence stable and evolutionary stable when η is fixed.
Convergence to worker-loss. Similarly, for adaptive dynamics to converge somewhere on
the edge where workers are no longer produced from regular sex (ω = 0), these two conditions
are necessary: (1) selection on caste determination maintains ω = 0 (i.e. sω(z) ≤ 0 when ω = 0);
and (2) selection on hybridization favours an equilibrium η∗ (i.e. sη(z) = 0 for some η
∗ when
ω = 0). Substituting eq. (B-5) into these conditions, they reduce to e ≥ 1/4 and η∗ = 2/3. In
















This tells us that the population will converge towards and remain monomorphic for η∗ = 2/3
when ω = 0 is fixed.
Three phase portraits. Put together, the above observations allow us to deduce that de-
pending on the parameter e, there are three possible types of phase portraits for the adaptive
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dynamics of both traits (fig. 3B-D). When e ≤ 1/4, the singular value eq. (B-6) is outside
of the trait space (or on its boundary when e = 1/4) and the point (ω = 1/3; η = 0) is an
evolutionary stable attractor, meaning that the population will converge towards hybridization
avoidance (fig. 3B). When e ≥ 1/2, the singular value eq. (B-6) is also outside of the trait space
(or on its boundary when e = 1/2) and the point (ω = 0; η = 2/3) is an evolutionary stable
attractor, meaning that the population will converge towards worker-loss (fig. 3D). Finally when
1/4 < e < 1/2, the singular value eq. (B-6) is a repellor that lies within the trait space (i.e.
0 < ω∗ < 1 and 0 < η∗ < 1) and both points (ω = 1/3; η = 0) and (ω = 0; η = 2/3) are
evolutionary stable attractors. In this case evolutionary dynamics will depend on initial values
(fig. 3C).
B.1.3 Decomposition of directional selection in terms of inclusive fitness effects
The kin selection approach. In this section, we use the so-called ”kin selection” or ”inclu-
sive fitness” approach to obtain the selection gradient eq. (B-5) (Taylor and Frank, 1996). This
approach, which is based on invasion analyses of alleles in class-structured populations, gives the
same quantitative result about directional selection than other common methods in theoretical
evolutionary biology such as adaptive dynamics, population or quantitative genetics (assuming
genetic variance for traits is small, e.g. Taylor and Frank, 1996, Rousset, 2004, Lehmann et al.,
2016). But one particular advantage of a kin selection approach is that it immediately decom-
poses directional selection on mutant alleles into the sum of: (1) their direct fitness effects on
the reproductive success of the individuals that express them; and (2) of their indirect fitness
effects on other related individuals that can also transmit them. This decomposition allows to
delineate the various forces at play in the evolution of social behaviours (Hamilton, 1964). Here,
we use it to better understand the evolution towards worker-loss (and obtain fig. 3E-F).
We follow Taylor and Frank (1996)’s general method. Consider a population with mean trait
values ω and η. In this population, consider a focal colony that is home to a mutant allele that
codes for deviant trait values η• in queens and ω• in larvae that carry this allele. Let ω0 denote
the mean trait value expressed by all larvae within this focal colony. Using this notation, the
expected number of successful (i.e. that mate) males that are produced by the focal colony and
13








f ((1− η)ω + ηe)
] , (B-11)
where the numerator and denominator are the total number of males produced by the focal and
a random colony, respectively. For the focal colony (the numerator), (1 − f) is the probability
that an egg is haploid (i.e. male) while the term in square brackets is the colony’s investment
in workers (which in our model is also the probability that a sexual reaches maturity). The
denominator follows the same logic for an average colony in the population.
Similarly, the expected number of successful queens that are produced by the focal colony that








f ((1− η)ω + ηe)
] , (B-12)
where f(1 − η•)(1 − ω•) is the number of queens produced in the focal colony and the term in
square brackets is the probability that a queen survives till mating (i.e. the colony’s investment
in workers).
Fitness effects within a mutant colony. With the above notation, the selection gradient























where all derivatives are evaluated at ω• = ω0 = ω and η• = η0 = η; rlm is the relatedness of a
female larva to a brother; rlf is the relatedness of a female larva to a sister; rqm is the relatedness
of a queen to its sons; rqf is the relatedness of a queen to its daughters; v is the reproductive
value of males and v is the reproductive value of queens (all these relatedness coefficients and
reproductive values are for a monomorphic population, Taylor and Frank, 1996, Rousset and
Ronce, 2004, Lehmann et al., 2016). Plugging eqs. (B-11) and (B-12) into eq. (B-13) with
relatedness coefficients and reproductive values corresponding to a haplodiploid system with
infinite matings (i.e. rlm = 1/2, rlf = 1/4, rqm = 1, rqf = 1/2, v = 1/2, v = 1), we obtain
expressions equivalent to eq. (B-5). But in contrast to eq. (B-5), the selection gradients in
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eq. (B-13) are expressed as a sum of fitness effects of a mutant allele via a given category of
individual. More specifically, the gradient sω(z) in eq. (B-13) is decomposed as the fitness effects




yellow line in fig. 3E), on their brothers (v
∂w
∂ω0




rlf , red line in fig. 3E) that can also transmit the allele. Similarly, the gradient
sη(z) in eq. (B-13) is composed of the fitness effects of an allele coding for a mutant value of η
in queens: via their sons (v
∂w
∂η•




red line in fig. 3F). To construct panels E and F of fig. 3, we evaluated these five terms outlined
above at every step of an evolutionary trajectory from the baseline equilibrium in absence of
hybridization (ω = 1/3, η = 0) to complete worker-loss (ω = 0, η = 2/3). The evolutionary
trajectory was obtained by iteration, starting from the baseline equilibrium and taking steps of
size 0.001 (in units of trait space) in the direction of the selection gradient (eq. B-5).
B.1.4 Correspondence with Reuter and Keller (2001)
Here we connect our results to those of Reuter and Keller (2001), who used a kin selection
approach to study the evolution of caste determination when under full queen, full larval, or
mixed control (in the absence of hybridization). Our model corresponds to the case of full larval
control (eq. 3 of Reuter and Keller, 2001). Our selection gradient sω(z), shown in eq. (B-1) with
η = 0, reduces to eq. 3 of Reuter and Keller (2001) when we assume linear effects of investment
in workers on colony productivity. More specifically, if we set their term ∆c = δs/(δw) × 1/f
(their notation in their eq. 3, where ∆c corresponds to the gain in sexual production brought





and assume that the population is monogynous and highly polyandrous with balanced sex-ratio
(i.e. in their notation, f = 1/2; gf = 1/4; gm = 1/2; vf = 2; vm = 1), then we find that eq. 3 of
Reuter and Keller (2001) is proportional to our selection gradient sω(z) (eq. B-1) with η = 0.
In line with this, both yield the convergence stable equilibrium w∗ = 1/3.
B.2 Extensions
We now consider several extensions to our baseline model.
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B.2.1 Effect of finite matings
First, we relax our assumption that queens mate with an infinite number of mates (i.e. m <∞).
Selection gradient. Working from eq. (A-8) with c = 0, we find that the selection gradient
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These gradients are complicated but we can extract relevant information by starting our analysis
on the two boundaries of the trait space along which evolutionary dynamics may end up (ω = 0
or η = 0). Using eq. (B-15), we ask first when is worker-loss (ω = 0) stable? And second when
is hybridization avoidance (η = 0) stable?
Stability of worker-loss. Worker-loss is stable only if: (1) selection maintains ω at zero (i.e.
sω(z) ≤ 0 when ω = 0); and (2) selection on hybridization settles for an equilibrium η∗ (i.e.
sη(z) = 0 for some η







(region above dashed line in fig. 4A) and
η∗ = 2/3. (B-17)
Note that condition (B-16) becomes impossible as m → 1. This indicates that worker-loss
cannot evolve under monandry in this model. For m > 1, it is straightforward to show that
when condition (B-16) is true, the strategy η = 2/3 is both convergence stable and evolutionary
stable when ω = 0 (eqs. B-9 and B-10 for e.g. of the type of argument used).
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Stability of hybridization avoidance. Conversely, hybridization avoidance is stable only if:
(1) selection on hybridization maintains η at zero (i.e. sη(z) ≤ 0 when η = 0); and (2) selection
on caste determination in absence of hybridization settles for an equilibrium ω∗ (i.e. sω(z) = 0

















Again, it is straightforward to show that when condition (B-18) holds, the strategy given by
eq. (B-19) is both convergence stable and evolutionary stable when η = 0 (eqs. B-3 and B-4 for
e.g. of argument).
Together, conditions (B-16) and (B-18) split the parameter space into 4 areas where both, none,
or only one of the conditions are met (fig. 4A). Where condition (B-18) is met but (B-16) is
not (grey region of fig. 4A), hybridization cannot evolve when rare and worker-loss cannot be
maintained. We therefore focus on the three remaining cases where worker loss can emerge.
Doing so, we find that there are four possible types of evolutionary dynamics.
Type 1: Evolution towards worker-loss. Where condition (B-16) is met but (B-18) is not
(dark green region of fig. 4A), selection favours the emergence of hybridization and maintenance
of worker-loss. In addition, it can be shown that under these conditions, there exists no singular
strategy within the trait space (i.e., there exists no z∗ = (ω∗, η∗) such that 0 < ω∗, η∗ < 1 and
s(z∗) = (0, 0), e.g. using the function Reduce[] in Mathematica, see notebook). This means that
the phase portrait of evolutionary dynamics is qualitatively the same as in fig. 3D: worker-loss
always evolves.
Type 2: Evolution towards worker-loss or hybridization avoidance depending on
initial conditions. Where conditions (B-16) and (B-18) are met simultaneously, both worker-
loss and hybridization avoidance are stable so either strategy is maintained when common (when
m ≥ 5, light green region of fig. 4A). Under these conditions, we find that there exists a singular
strategy within the trait space (top row, columns m = 5 and m = 6 in fig. S1 for numerical
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values, see Mathematica notebook for analytical expression). When we compute numerically the
leading eigenvalue of the system’s Jacobian matrix, we find that it is positive (fig. S1, second
row, columns m = 5 and m = 6, dashed line), revealing that the singularity is an evolutionary
repellor. Therefore the phase portrait of evolutionary dynamics is qualitatively the same as
in fig. 3C: depending on initial conditions, evolutionary dynamics will lead to worker-loss or
hybridization avoidance.
Type 3: Convergence stable and uninvadable intermediate strategy. Where neither
condition (B-16) nor (B-18) are met, neither worker-loss nor hybridization avoidance are stable
(when m ≤ 4, blue region of fig. 4A). In this case, a singular strategy within the trait space also
exists (0 < ω∗, η∗ < 1; fig. S1, top row, columns m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} for numerical values; Math-
ematica notebook for analytical expression). But now, this intermediate strategy is (strongly)
convergence stable as indicated by a negative leading eigenvalue of both the Jacobian matrix
and its symmetric part (fig. S1, second row, columns m ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, dashed and dotted lines).
When m ∈ {2, 3, 4}, this intermediate strategy is also uninvadable as shown by a negative lead-
ing eigenvalue of the Hessian matrix (fig. S1, second row, columns m ∈ {2, 3, 4}, full line). Thus,
when the number of mates is between two and four (m ∈ {2, 3, 4}) and neither conditions (B-16)
and (B-18) are met, the population converges and remains monomorphic for an intermediate
strategy 0 < ω∗, η∗ < 1.
Type 4: Emergence of polymorphism under monandry. When neither condition (B-16)
nor (B-18) are met and m = 1, the convergence stable intermediate strategy is invadable (i.e.,
the Hessian has a positive leading eigenvalue; fig. S1, second row, column m = 1, dashed line).
This means that once the population has converged to this intermediate strategy, it experiences
frequency-dependent disruptive selection leading to polymorphism (Geritz et al., 1998, Geritz
and Gyllenberg, 2005, Geritz et al., 2016). Inspection of the entries of the Hessian matrix reveals
that
hωη(z
∗)2 − hωω(z∗)hηη(z∗) > 0 (B-20)
(fig. S2A, black line) and that hωω(z
∗) ≤ 0 and hηη(z∗) ≤ 0 (fig. S2A, green and grey lines).
This says that disruptive selection in our model is due to correlational selection between caste
determination and hybridization (i.e. the selection that associates caste determination and
hybridization, Phillips and Arnold, 1989) and only occurs because both traits are coevolving
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Figure S1: Properties of the internal singular strategy under monoandry
and low polyandry. Each column describes the unique internal singular strategy for
a specific value of m. Top row: value of the singular strategy (ω∗ in green, η∗ in black)
within the range of e for which an internal strategy exists (range given by eqs. B-16 and
B-18; Mathematica notebook for value of singular strategy). Bottom row: leading
eigenvalues of the Jacobian (dashed line; for convergence stability), symmetric part of
the Jacobian (dotted line; for strong convergence stability) and Hessian (full line; for
evolutionary stability) matrices at the singular strategy (Mathematica notebook for
calculations).
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(i.e. if either trait evolves while the other is fixed, the population remains monomorphic, e.g.
Mullon et al., 2018). We also find that
hωη(z
∗) > 0 (B-21)
(fig. S2A, blue line), which tells us that correlational selection is positive (i.e. selection favours a
positive correlation between caste determination and hybridization within individuals, Phillips
and Arnold, 1989). This is confirmed by individual based simulations, in which we observe the
emergence of a polymorphism characterised by a positive correlation between ω and η within





























































Figure S2: Polymorphism under monandry is due to positive correlational
selection. A. Characteristics of the Hessian matrix at the internal singular strategy as
a function of e for m = 1 (first column of fig. S1 for singular value): quadratic selection
coefficient on ω (hωω(z
∗), in green) and on η hηη(z
∗), in grey); correlational selection
(hωη(z
∗), in blue) and its relative strength (hωη(z
∗)2−hωω(z∗)hηη(z∗), in black, Math-
ematica notebook for calculations). B. Correlation between genetic values of each trait
within haplotypes in a simulated population (in gray, 4000 haplotypes sampled every
100 generations to compute Pearson’s correlation coefficient, same replicate as fig. 4C;
cumulative mean in black dashed). C & D Distribution of genetic values of all hap-
lotypes after 1000 generations (panel C) and after 100000 generations (panel D, same
replicate as panel B and fig. 4C).
B.2.2 Effect of thelytokous parthenogenesis
When we allow for a fraction c of a queens brood to be produce parthenogenetically, the selection
gradient (obtained from eq. A-8) is too complicated to be displayed or for singular strategies to
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be found analytically. We therefore go through an invasion analysis similar to above (Appendix
B.1.2 and B.2.1) and again ask: (1) under which conditions and values of ω is hybridization
avoidance (η = 0) stable? and (2) under which conditions and values of η is worker-loss (ω = 0)
stable?
Stability of hybridization avoidance. Hybridization avoidance is stable if selection on caste
determination settles for an equilibrium ω∗ in the absence of hybridization (i.e. sω(z) = 0 for
some ω∗ when η = 0), and if selection on hybridization at this equilibrium maintains η at zero















2(5− c)(c+ 2m− 1)
+
4(3− c)(1− c)2
(5− c)(3 + c) [(1− c)2 + (c+ 3)m]
. (B-23)
Condition eq. (B-23) corresponds to the area of the graph below the plain line in fig. 5A-B,
where hybridization avoidance is stable. Conversely, the area above the plain line in fig. 5A-B
(in blue) is where avoidance is not stable and thus where hybridization evolves.
Stability of worker-loss. Similarly, worker-loss is stable if selection on hybridization settles
for an equilibrium η∗ in the absence of developmental plasticity (i.e. sη(z) = 0 for some 0 <











(fig. 5D). The equilibrium eq. (B-24) is between 0 and 1 (0 < η∗ < 1) and selection at this















Note that condition eq. (B-25) is only possible when m ≥ 2. It therefore does not appear in
fig. 5A (which is for the case m = 1) but corresponds to the area above the dotted line in fig. 5B
(which has m = 2).
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Worker-loss coupled with complete hybridization. In principle, it is also possible with
parthenogenesis for a population to evolve worker-loss (ω = 0) with complete hybridization
(η = 1) (as parthenogenesis allows the production of queens in the absence of intraspecific
matings). We therefore further need to determine whether worker-loss can also be stable in the
case where η = 1 (rather than for some 0 < η∗ < 1). We find that selection under worker-
loss (ω = 0) and complete hybridization (η = 1) maintains both worker-loss and complete
hybridization (i.e. sω(z) ≤ 0 and sη(z) ≥ 0 where z = (ω, η) = (0, 1)) when
e ≥ c
1− c
and c ≥ m− 1
3m− 1
. (B-26)
Condition eq. (B-26) corresponds to the area above the dashed line in fig. 5A-B. While condition
eq. (B-25) can only be met only under polyandry (m > 1), condition eq. (B-26) can be met for
any number of mates m. This means that the evolution of worker-loss under monandry and
thelytokous parthenogenesis is always associated with complete hybridization in our model.
B.2.3 Effect of non-linear workforce productivity
Our analyses so far have assumed a linear effect of worker number on colony fitness (α = 1 in
eq. A-2b). Here we investigate how non-linear effects of the number of workers on the pre-mating
survival of virgin queens and males influence our results. We restrict our exploration to the case
where queens mate with an infinite number of males and do not reproduce via parthenogenesis
for simplicity (m → ∞ and c = 0). With α in eq (A-2b) as a variable, we find from eq. (A-8)
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η∗ = 1 +
3e
(e− 1)(1 + 2α)
(B-28)
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It is straightforward to show from eq. (B-29) that the singular strategy eq. (B-28) is a repellor,
just as under linear effects (α = 1, eq. B-7). This indicates that as illustrated in fig. 3, the
coevolution of caste determination and hybridization under non-linear effects also lead to either
hybridization avoidance or worker-loss depending on parameters and initial conditions.
We can gain further insights into the influence of non-linear effects by determining when the
singular strategy eq. (B-28) is within the trait space (i.e., when 0 < ω∗, η∗ < 1). We find that







(light green region in fig. S3). This means that the threshold value for worker efficiency e above
which worker-loss can evolve is 1/4 (as under linear effects α = 1). Condition (B-30) further
shows that the threshold for e above which worker-loss always evolves (i.e. independently from
initial conditions, fig. 3D for e.g.) increases with α (dark green region in fig. S3). In other words,
the evolution of worker loss is facilitated under diminishing (α < 1, fig. S3A) and impaired under
increasing returns (α > 1, fig. S3C).
Figure S3: Non-linear effects of investment in workers. Singular values for
η (in black) and ω (in white) as a function of hybrid worker efficiency e (given by
eq. B-28).
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